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ABSTRACT:  This article focuses on personalities, or individual differences, of 
world political leaders.  After arguing that international relations theory has 
experienced a turn toward decision makers, I briefly overview one of the dominant 
approaches to the study of leader personality in foreign policy:  Leadership Trait 
Analysis.  While this research includes a number of important studies that directly 
challenge traditional understandings of international relations and engage with 
international relations theory, I argue that the subfield of personality studies in foreign 
policy is ripe for new theoretical and methodological developments. In the final 
section of this article, I outline several specific areas for future research, including a 
connection between foreign policy-personality approaches and the growing body of 
work on political leadership. 
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Introduction1 
Who leads matters in the foreign policy of states.  This statement is supported 
by numerous studies, as well as by observations by leaders themselves. In an 
interview, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once stated:  “as a professor, 
I tended to think of history as run by imperial forces.  But when you see it in practice, 
you see the differences personalities make.”2    
Leaders can significantly affect foreign policy, in both democracies and 
authoritarian states.  As Hermann and Hagan have argued:  “state leaders play a 
pivotal role in balancing international imperatives with those arising from, or 
embedded in, domestic politics.”3  Leaders influence the motives, strategies, and 
policies of their own states and are therefore a critical component of their countries 
diplomatic capabilities.4  According to Hermann and Hagan:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  This paper was originally presented at the Foreign Policy Analysis:  Why 
Psychology and Neurosciences Do Matter conference, Centre des Researches 
International-Sciences, Paris, 12 February 2016.  The parts of this article on the 
importance of personality and on Leadership Trait Analysis draw directly from my 
research with Çuhadar, Kesgin, and Özkeçeci-Taner (see, for example, Esra Çuhadar, 
Juliet Kaarbo, Baris Kesgin and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, ‘Examining Interactions 
Between Agents and Structures: Turkey’s 1991 and 2003 Iraqi War Decisions, 
Journal of International Relations and Development 20(1) (2017b) 29-54) and from 
my research on prime ministers (e.g., Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister Leadership Style 
and the Role of Parliament in Security Policy,’ British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations (forthcoming)).  The section on the agent in international 
relations is a more specifically-focused argument derived from my article Juliet 
Kaarbo, ‘A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR,’ 
International Studies Review 17 (2015), pp. 189-216. 
2 Walter Isaacson Kissinger: A biography (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), p.13 
3  Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, ‘International Decision Making:  
Leadership Matters,’ Foreign Policy 110 (1998), pp124-136, p.126. 
4 Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men:  
Bringing Statesman Back In,’ International Security 25 (2001), pp. 107-146. 
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“Leaders define state’s international and domestic constraints.  Based 
on their perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan 
strategies, and urge actions on their governments that confirm with 
their judgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in 
their positions.  Such perceptions help frame governments’ 
orientations to international affairs.  Leaders’ interpretations arise out 
of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to 
the political context.”5 
Leaders and their characteristics may be more important for states’ foreign 
policies under certain conditions, such as when bureaucratic, domestic or systemic, 
contexts are ambiguous, complex, uncertain or dynamic, when trade-offs are part of 
countries’ foreign policies, when foreign policy choices involve symbolism, and when 
decision making authority is concentrated and restricted to the top leader.6 The 
importance of leaders and leaders’ personalities is not limited to presidents and 
authoritarian rulers.  Leaders in parliamentary systems, particularly prime ministers 
are also influential.  Prime ministers, for example, can shape decision making 
processes by agenda setting, by choosing advisors, and through their appointments of 
cabinet ministers..7   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hermann and Hagan, op.cit., p. 126.  
6 Byman and Pollack op. cit.; Fred I. Greenstein, ‘Can Personality and Politics be 
Studied Systematically?, Political Psychology, 13(1) (1992), pp. 105-128. 
7  Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-
Making:  A Framework for Research,’ Political Psychology 18 (1997), pp. 553-581; 
Juliet Kaarbo and Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers:  How 
Individual Differences Affect the Foreign Policymaking Process,’ Leadership 
Quarterly, 9 (1998), pp.131-152; Keith Dowding, ‘Prime-Ministerial Power:  
Institutional and Personal Factors,’ in Strangio, ‘t Hart, and Walter (Eds.) 
Understanding Prime-Ministerial Performance:  Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 57-78; Paul Strangio, Paul ‘t Hart, and James Walter, 
‘Prime Ministers and the Performance of Public Leadership,’ in Strangio, ‘t Hart, and 
Walter op. cit., pp. 1-28. 
	   4	  
As others have noted, to continue to debate whether or not leaders matter is 
unproductive and it is best to focus research on how leadership and the characteristics 
of leaders influence foreign policies.8  There are a number of ways to address this 
question, including a focus leaders’ representations of ill-defined problems, their 
beliefs about politics and images of other countries, their risk-orientations, their 
pathologies and illnesses and leaders’ cognitive shortcuts, misperceptions, and 
motivated reasoning. 9   
The focus in this article is on personalities, or individual differences, of leaders.  
After arguing that international relations theory has experienced a turn toward 
decision makers, I briefly overview one of the dominant approaches to the study of 
leader personality in foreign policy:  Leadership Trait Analysis.  While this research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hermann and Hagan op. cit.; Byman and Pollack op cit.; Stephen Benedict Dyson, 
The Blair Identity:  Leadership and Foreign Policy.  (Manchester:  Manchester 
University Press, 2009a); Vaughn P. Shannon and Jonathan W. Keller, ‘Leadership 
Style and International Norm Violation:  The Case of the Iraq War,’ Foreign Policy 
Analysis 3 (2007), pp.79-104. Stephen Benedict Dyson, ‘Gordon Brown, Alistair 
Darling, and the Great Financial Crisis: Leadership Traits and Policy Responses. 
British Politics. (Epub ahead of print 13 September 2016.  DOI: 10.1057/s41293-
016-0027-3). 
9 See, for example, Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, ‘Operational Code Analysis 
at a Distance: The Verbs in Context System of Content Analysis,” in Mark Schafer 
and Stephen G. Walker (Eds.) Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and 
Applications of Operational Code Analysis (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
pp. 25-51; Richard Herrmann, and Michael Fischerkeller, ‘Beyond the Enemy Image 
Spiral Model:  Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War,’ International 
Organization 49 (1995), pp. 415-450; Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision 
Making:  The Influence of Cognition, (Boulder, CO, 1986):  Westview Press; Yuen 
Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Rose 
McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics:  Prospect Theory in American 
Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 1998);  Jack S. Levy, 
‘Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict,” in Manus Midlarsky 
(ed.) Handbook of War Studies II (Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 2000), 
pp. 193-221; Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds (Stanford, CA:  Stanford 
University Press, 1990); Donald Sylvan, and James Voss (eds.), Problem 
Representation and Political Decision Making,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
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includes a number of important studies that directly challenge traditional 
understandings of international relations and engage with international relations 
theory, I argue that the subfield of personality studies in foreign policy is particularly 
ripe for new theoretical and methodological developments.  In the final section of this 
article, I outline several specific areas for future research, including a connection 
between foreign policy-personality approaches and the growing body of work on 
political leadership. 
 
The Agent in International Relations:  A Turn in IR Theory and The Political 
Psychology Perspective 
Agents, particularly individuals, have historically not been at the center of our 
understanding of international relations.  Instead, structural explanations of 
international relations and foreign policies, at both the international-systemic and the 
internal-domestic levels, have dominated research and theory on international politics, 
despite a long line of research in foreign policy analysis emphasizing the importance 
of the psychology of human decision making.  From neo-realism’s focus on anarchy 
and distribution of power to liberalism’s expectations on the constraining factors of 
economic interdependent structures and international regimes, foreign policy is 
typically seen as a product of international forces faced by states and their leaders.10  
System-level constructivism also focuses on normative structures to explain state 
behavior, while state-level constructivists and liberal democratic peace scholars point 
to cultural values and norms, operating as structures of constraint on leaders and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 e.g., Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great 
Powers Politics (London, New York: Norton, 2001); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 
Nye, Power and Interdependence:  World Politics in Transition (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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foreign policy.11 The institutional explanation of the democratic peace focuses on the 
constraining effects of institutional structures. 12 And rational choice theories of 
domestic costs and neo-classical realism’s conception of the executive who must 
bargain with domestic political actors to extract resources in order to respond to 
international pressures also see political-domestic structures as limits on foreign 
policy.13  All of these approaches have minimized the role of agency in international 
politics.  Yet various IR theories have experienced a turn in recent years, a turn 
toward incorporating agents and particularly decision-making approaches.14  While 
this cross-theory development is promising, it is quite underdeveloped.  
Some democratic peace theorists, for example, have incorporated perceptions 
in their explanations. Owen, for example, argues that “history shows many cases 
where perceptions tripped up democratic peace....To determine which states belong to 
the pacific union, we must do more than simply examine their constitutions. We must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  e.g., Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) 
‘Norm Dynamics International and Political Change,’ International Organization 52 
(4) (1998), pp. 887–917; Peter Katzenstein, Peter (Ed.) The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996); Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and 
Foreign Policy, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); 
John M. Owen, John M., ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,’ International 
Security, vol.19, no.2 (1994), pp. 87-125. 
12 e.g., Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold 
War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Alexandre Debs and H.E. 
Goemans (2010 ) ‘Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,’ American Political 
Science Review 104 (2010), pp. 430-45. 
13 e.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James 
D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); 
Brian Lai and Dan Slater, ‘Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute 
Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992,’ American Journal of Political 
Science 50 (2006), pp. 113–126; Jessica L. Weeks, ‘Strongmen and Straw Men: 
Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,’ American Political 
Science Review 106 (2012), pp. 326–347.  
14 For a similar argument, see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Stephan Haggard, David A. 
Lake, and David G. Victor, ‘The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations,’ 
International Organization 71 (Supplement) (2017), pp. S1-S-31. 
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examine how the liberals themselves define democracy.”15 This perceptual approach 
opens the door for an analysis of agents, but, as Hayes notes, “scholarly understanding 
of the mechanisms of the democratic peace remains uncertain” and “much 
work...remains to be done relating the psychological processes of leaders to the 
foreign and security policies of democracies.”16  
Many have noted the theoretical importance of agents in constructivist IR 
theory.  As Smith argues, “social construction starts from the assumption that actors 
make their worlds.”17 Checkel agrees that constructivists have “a strong focus on 
agency.”18   Yet most constructivist research privileges social structures over agency. 
According to Flanik, “constructivists endorse co-constitution in principle, but in 
practice, much constructivist works favors structure.” 19  Barnett agrees that 
“constructivism has tended to operate with an oversocialized view of actors, treating 
them as near bearers of structures and, at the extreme, as cultural dupes. The real 
danger here is the failure to recognize that actors have agency, can be strategic, are 
aware of the cultural and social rules that presumably limit their practices, and as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Owen, op.cit., pp. 96-97 
16 Jarrod  Hayes, ‘The Democratic Peace and the New Evolution of an Old Idea,’ 
European  Journal of International Relations 18 (2011), pp. 767-791, pp. 782-83. 
17 Steve Smith, ‘Foreign Policy Is What States Make of It:  Social Construction and 
International Relations Theory,’ in V. Kubálková (ed.), Foreign Policy in a 
Constructed World (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 38-55. 
Smith, 2001:38; see also Marijke Breuning, ‘Role Theory Research in International 
Relations:  State of the Art and Blind Spot’ in S. Harnisch, C. Frank, and H. W. Maull 
(eds.), Role Theory In International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011), pp.16-35; 
David Patrick Houghton, ‘Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision 
Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach,’ Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (1) (2007), 
Vaughn P. Shannon, ‘Introduction,’ in V.P. Shannon and P.A. Kowert (Eds.) 
Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations (Ann Arbor:  University of 
Michigan Press, 2012), pp. 24-45. 
18 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Constructivism and Foreign Policy,’ in Steve Smith, Amelia 
Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Eds.) Foreign Policy (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
19 William Flanik, ‘”Bringing FPA Back Home:”  Cognition, Constructivism, and 
Conceptual Metaphor,’ Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011), pp. 1-24, p.9. 
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knowledgeable actors are capable of appropriating those cultural taproots for various 
ends.”20 Constructivism also tends to black-box processes of social construction and 
ignores ideational factors that operate within individuals’ belief systems.21  
Neoclassical realism has also turned the realist approach toward decision-
making factors and agents. Neoclassical realists have aimed to develop a realist 
perspective on foreign policy, rejecting arguments that unit-level characteristics are 
unimportant and that IR theory must be separate from foreign policy theory,.22 
Neoclassical realism sees the international system and relative material capabilities as 
filtered through the state. State responses to systemic imperatives are influenced by a 
variety of of domestic political and decision-making factors, including perceptions 
and perceived lessons of the past.  As Wivel notes, “neoclassic realist foreign policy 
analysis stresses that foreign policy decisions are made by human beings, political 
leaders and elites.”23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Michael Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change:  Israel’s Road to 
Oslo,’ European Journal of International Relations 5 (1999), pp. 5-36, p. 7; see also 
Breuning, op.cit. 
21 Asli Ilgit and Özkeçeci-Taner, Binnur, ‘Identity and Decision Making:  Toward a 
Collaborative Approach to State Action,’ in Shannon and Kowert, op. cit. 
22 For overviews, see Samuel Barkin, ‘Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy,’ 
Foreign Policy Analysis (2009), pp. 233-246; Stephen G. Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms,’ 
International Organization 51 (1997), pp. 445-477; Steve E. Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical Realism, The State, and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2009); Anders Wivel, 
‘Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday:  The Promise and 
Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,’ Journal of International Relations 
and Development 8 (2005), pp. 355-380. 
23 Wivel, op. cit., p. 361; see also Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories 
of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics 51 (1998), pp.144-72; examples include Stephen 
M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (NY:  Cornell University Press, 1987); Stephen 
Van Evera, Causes of War:  Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 1999); David M. Edelstein, ‘Managing Uncertainty:  Beliefs about 
Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,’ Security Studies 12 (2002), pp. 1-40; Steven 
E. Lobell, ‘Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy:  A Neoclassical Realist 
Model,’ in Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro op. cit., pp. 42-74. 
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Neoclassical realism attention to perceptions and beliefs, however, is critically 
underdeveloped. As Goldgeier argues, Walt’s research, for example, “argues for the 
importance of perceptions, beliefs, motivation, and bias while leaving the origins of 
these factors to case-by-case empirical study rather than systematic theoretical 
investigation.” 24  Wivel agrees that neoclassical realism ignores how objective 
material forces are interpreted and perceived and interpreted by leaders. He argues: “if 
we acknowledge that foreign policy is made by real people interpreting their 
environment, including the structure of the international system, then we need to 
engage in a discussion of how we understand the interplay between materialist and 
idealist variables.”25  
While the cross-theoretical turn in IR to incorporate decision-making is a 
positive development to address the agent-structure ‘problem,’26 the agent remains 
under-theorized and some of the assumptions in IR theory are easily challenged by 
decades of research on the political psychology of foreign policy. A political 
psychological perspective can provide an approach, or “frame of reference”, as 
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin proposed as early as 1954.27 A psychologically-oriented and 
agent-based perspective offers a distinct standpoint from which to look at the world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 James M. Goldgeier, ‘Psychology and Security,’ Security Studies 4 (1997), pp. 137-
66, p.14. 
25 Wivel, op. cit.: 367-8. See also Goldgeier op. cit.; Freyberg-Inan, Harrison, and 
James (Eds.) Rethinking Realism in International Relations (Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
26 In Dessler’s (p.443) words, the “agent-structure problem” is a philosophical issue 
which “emerges from two un-contentious truths about social life: first, that human 
agency is the only moving force behind actions, events, and outcomes of the social 
world; and second, that human agency can be realized only in concrete historical 
circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course.” 
(David Dessler, ‘What is at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?’ International 
Organization 43 (1989), pp. 441-473. 
27 R.C. Snyder,H.W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the 
Study of International Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series No. 3 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1954). 
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and international relations.  A psychological perspective foregrounds decision makers 
and the subjective understandings of leaders as filters for other international and 
domestic opportunities and constraints.28  How decision makers interpret and respond 
to their domestic and international environments is subject to a number of factors – 
psychological, societal, ideational, political, institutional, and material. A 
psychological approach thus offers integration of a variety of IR theories, and their 
theoretical turns, through this psychological experience of agents.  
 
Personality Differences and their Effects on Foreign Policy and International 
Relations:  LTA Research 
As noted earlier, there are a number of ways to examine the psychology of 
agents in international relations and foreign policy.  The focus in this article is on 
personalities of leaders. Personality can be defined as a patterned relationship among 
cognition, affect, motivations and orientations toward interpersonal relationships.29 
There is considerable variance in leaders’ personalities, even with the same political 
system and political cultures.  Personalities, or individual differences, are a critical 
sources of ‘the heterogeneity of preferences, beliefs and decision-making processes’ 
that are significant in international politics.30 Personality characteristics condition how 
leaders respond to both international and domestic constraints and opportunities.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Valerie Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground 
of International Relations,’ Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (2005), pp.1-30. 
29 Jerrold M. Post, The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders (Ann Arbor:  
University of Michigan Press, 2003), p.77; for a recent review of psychological 
approaches to leaders, see Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Political Psychology’ in R.A.W. 
Rhodes and P. ‘t Hart (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2015). 
30 Hafner-Burton et al, op. cit. p. S4.  It is interesting to note that the special issue of 
International Organization edited and introduced by Hafner-Buron et al (op. cit.) pays 
no attention to personalities of leaders, despite its focus on the heterogeneity of 
	   11	  
Within the study of leader’s personality, I choose here to focus specifically on 
the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) approach for a number of reasons.  First, as a 
robust area of research, LTA work has demonstrated the importance of personality in 
international relations in a number of different contexts.  Second, it is a composite, or 
multi-factor approach, incorporating beliefs, traits, and style and thus a broader 
picture of leadership differences than single trait or beliefs-oriented approaches.  
Third, LTA provides specific expectations regarding which characteristics of leaders 
matter and how.  Leaders with different traits are expected to relate to their context, 
institutional setting, costs and benefits of various policy options, and other agents in 
theoretically meaningful and predictable ways.  Fourth, LTA is particularly useful for 
investigating agent-structure relations, with its focus on constraint challengers vs. 
constraint respecters (discussed below).   Finally, the LTA approach provides a 
reliable, systematic, and comparative method for assessing agent characteristics. 
 
LTA Conceptual Framework and Findings 
 The Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) framework is one of the best known and 
well research perspective on political leaders’ personalities.  Developed by Margaret 
Hermann .31 LTA scholarship has explored how seven personality traits – belief in 
ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-
group bias, self-confidence, and task orientation (see Table 1)– explain leaders’ 
tendencies to respect or  constraints, their openness to advice and information, the 
nature of their advisory systems, the quality and effectiveness of decision making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
preferences, beliefs, and decision-making processes in what they term ‘the behavioral 
revolution in international relations.’ 
31 Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal 
Characteristics of Political Leaders,’ International Studies Quarterly 24 (1980), pp. 7-
46. 
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processes, and the policies leaders ultimately choose.32 LTA is a composite approach 
to personality, combining elements of leaders’ beliefs, motives, traits, and style. 
Leaders who have a high belief in their ability to control events and a high need for 
power, for example, are expected to challenge constraints.  Conceptual complexity 
and self-confidence are related to and predict leaders’ openness to information from 
and about their environments. LTA is also a more process- and behaviourally-oriented 
than other approaches to leaders’ personalities, rather than capturing the general 
content and structure of leaders’ beliefs.33   
LTA has captured the personalities of many leaders, including Soviet 
politburo members, U.S. presidents and their presidential advisors, European Prime 
Ministers, sub-Saharan African, Iranian, Israeli and Turkish leaders, , and heads of 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union.34 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 e.g., Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, Groupthink vs. High-Quality Decision 
Making in International Relations (Columbia University Press, 2010); Stephen 
Benedict Dyson, ‘Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions,’ 
Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (2006), 289-306; Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Assessing 
Leadership Style: A Traits Analysis’, in Jerrold M. Post (Ed.), The Psychological 
Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 178-215; Kent J. Kille and 
Roger M. Scully, ‘Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations:  
Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European Union,’ Political 
Psychology 24 (2003), pp. 175-198. 
33 See Shannon and Keller op. cit., p. 83, footnote 5. 
34 Scott Crichlow, ‘Idealism or Pragmatism?  An Operational Code Analysis of 
Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres,’ Political Psychology 19(4) (1998): 683-706. 
Dyson, 2006 op. cit.; Stephen Benedict Dyson, ‘”Stuff Happens”: Donald Rumsfeld 
and the Iraq War,’ Foreign Policy Analysis 5 (2009), pp. 327-347; Margaret G. 
Hermann, ‘Personality and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Study of 53 Heads of 
Government,’ in D. A. Sylvan and S. Chan (Eds.) Foreign Policy Decisionmaking: 
Perceptions, Cognition, and Artiﬁcial Intelligence (New York: Praeger, 1984); 
Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Assessing the Foreign Policy Role Orientations of Sub-
Saharan African Leaders,’ in S. G. Walker (Ed.) Role Theory and Foreign Policy 
Analysis (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); Kille and Scully op. cit.; Elena 
Mastors, ‘Gerry Adams and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,’ Political Psychology 
21 (2000), pp. 839–846; Thomas Preston, The President and his Inner Circle: 
Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001); Tanyel Taysi and Thomas Preston, ‘The Personality and 
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vast body of research demonstrates variation in leaders’ personality traits. Schafer and 
Crichlow’s study of nine leaders, for example, found considerable variation in their 
LTA scores, as did Shannon and Keller in their study of six U.S. policymakers and 
Van Esch and Swinkels investigation of six European leaders during the Euro Crisis.35 
Hermann’s 1980 landmark study demonstrated significant differences in the 
leadership traits of 80 heads of government across 38 countries.36  
 
Table 1 
Personality Characteristics in Leadership Trait Analysis 
Source:  Çuhadar et al (2017b), drawing on Hermann, 2003 op. cit. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Leadership Style of President Khatami: Implications for the Future of Iranian Political 
Reform,’ in O. Feldman and L. O. Valenty (Eds.), Proﬁling Political Leaders: A 
Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior (Westport: Praeger, 2001); 
Schafer and Crichlow 2010, op. cit.; Shannon and Keller op. cit.; Baris Kesgin, 
‘Leadership Traits of Turkey’s “Islamist” and “Secular” Prime Ministers,’ Turkish 
Studies, 14(1) (2013), pp. 136-57; Femke Van Esch and Marij Swinkels, ‘How 
Europe’s Political Leaders Made Sense of the Euro Crisis:  The Influence of Pressure 
and Personality,’ West European Politics 38(6) (2015), pp. 1203-1225; Klaus 
Brummer, ‘”Fiasco Prime Ministers”: Leaders’ Beliefs and Personality Traits as 
Possible Causes for Policy Fiascos,’ Journal of European Public Policy 23(5) (2016), 
pp. 702-717; Dyson 2016 op. cit. 
35 Schafer and Crichlow 2010, op. cit; Shannon and Keller op. cit.; Van Esch and 
Swinkels, op. cit. 
36 Hermann 1980, op. cit. 
LTA Trait Description 
Belief in Ability to 
Control Events 
perception of own degree of control over political world 
Need for Power interest in developing, preserving, or reinstituting own 
power 
Conceptual Complexity ability to distinguish complexities of political life 
Self-Confidence notion of self-importance, and of capacity to take on 
political environment 
In-group Bias 
 
belief that own group constitutes center of political world 
Distrust of Others suspicions, skepticism, worry of others outwith own group 
Task Focus focus on problem solving vs. building relationships 
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What does LTA explain? LTA research has demonstrated that its seven 
personality traits systematically link to policies leaders choose for their country or 
organization. 37   Hermann’s 1980 study systematically correlated the personality 
characteristics of 80 leaders (using manual content analysis) with over 12,000 events 
of foreign policy behavior.  She found statistically significant relationships between 
several individual traits and foreign policy.  Leaders who were high in their need for 
power, for example, were less likely to engage in multilateral or interdependent 
behaviors.  Leaders who were high in nationalism and distrust were more likely to act 
negatively towards others.   Building on Hermann’s earlier work, Keller’s study (of 
39 leaders in 154 foreign policy crises), found leaders’ traits statistically significantly 
correlated with the centrality and severity of violence in states’ crises behaviors.   
Additional studies have also linked LTA personality profiles to foreign policy 
outcomes, In their analysis of nine leaders across several cases, Schafer and Crichlow 
found leaders’ distrust was significantly, and positively related to more aggressive 
foreign policy outcomes.38  In their quantitative analyses of leaders’ traits and U.S. 
military policies from 1953 to 2000, Keller and Foster found that conceptual 
complexity, distrust, belief in the ability to control events, and self-confidence were 
correlated with diversionary use of force.39  Çuhadar et al’s study of Turkish foreign 
policy traces the different decisions that Turkey made in 1991 vs. 2003 vis-à-vis Iraq 
to differences in President Ozal and Prime Minister Erdogan’s decision making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 e.g., Hermann 2003 op. cit., 2006; Kille and Scully op. cit.;  Schafer and Crichlow 
2010 op. cit. 
38 Schafer and Crichlow 2010 op. cit. 
39 Jonathan W. Keller, and Dennis W. Foster, ‘Presidential Leadership Style and the 
Political Use of Force,’ Political Psychology 33(5) (2012), pp. 581-598; Dennis M. 
Foster and Jonathan W. Keller, ‘Leaders’ Cognitive Complexity, Distrust, and the 
Diversionary Use of Force,’ Foreign Policy Analysis 10(3) (2014), pp. 205-223. 
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styles.40  Dyson’s detailed research of British Prime Minister Tony Blair used LTA to 
trace the effects of Blair’s personality in British foreign policy decision making in the 
Iraq war.41  After careful consideration of alternative explanations, Dyson concludes: 
“Blair’s personality is a crucial factor in understanding why the British went to war.”   
Blair’s influence on this foreign policy outcome came through his imprint on 
the process.  Dyson argues that Blair’s low complexity, high need for power, and high 
belief in his ability to control events affected Blair’s “proactive policy orientation, 
internal locus of control in terms of shaping events, a binary information processing 
and framing style, and a preference to work through tightly held processes in policy 
making.”42 In their creative study of groupthink, Schafer and Crichlow, for example, 
examine the relationships between LTA traits of nine leaders and the quality of 
decision making in cases of foreign policy in which the individual was an important 
actor.43  Their findings highlighted the importance of distrust.  Leaders with high 
levels of distrust were statistically significantly correlated with group structural faults 
(such as biased leadership, group homogeneity) and decision-processing faults (such 
as poor information search and biased information processing) in their cases.  
Brummer (2016), on the other hand, found that British PMs with high self-confidence 
and how need for power were associated with foreign policy fiascos. 
As noted earlier, one advantage of using the LTA framework for investigating 
agent-structure relations is that it provides specific expectations regarding which 
characteristics of agents matter, and how, in their orientations toward structures.  
Leaders with different traits and trait combinations are expected to relate to their 
institutional settings and political environments, and to those around them in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Çuhadar et al., (2017b) op. cit. 
41 Dyson 2006 op. cit; 2009 op. cit. 
42 Dyson 2006 op. cit., p. 303. 
43 Schafer and Crichlow 2010 op. cit. 
	   16	  
predictable ways. Keller makes a strong argument based on a distinction between 
direct and potential constraints.  Direct constraints, such as shared power, do exist as 
objective obstacles to leaders in pursuit of their preferred policies, “but direct 
constraints are the exception.  Most constraints are open to multiple interpretations or 
can be overcome in the short term (though the longer-term political or personal 
consequences may be very serious).” 44  “Contrary to prevailing structure-based 
theories, potential constraints in any political environment must be activated by 
leaders’ responsiveness to them before they can influence policy behavior.”45   
Indeed, LTA research has demonstrated that a key personality characteristic 
that varies across political leaders is their sensitivity to their environment and their 
orientation to constraints,. Some leaders confront constraints, challenge costs and 
benefits, ignore institutional incentives, while other respect these pressures and 
limits..46 Some leaders are crusaders ideologues, or ideologically driven, while others 
are pragmatists, opportunities, or context sensitive. 47 LTA researchers expect that for 
leaders’ orientations to constraints act as an intervening variable for other personality 
traits; leaders’ other belief and basic personality characteristics, for example, are more 
likely to affect policymaking and outcomes for leaders who challenge their political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Jonathan W. Keller, ‘Constraint Respecters, Constraint Challengers, and Crisis 
Decision Making in Democracies:  A Case Study Analysis of Kennedy versus 
Reagan,’ Political Psychology 26(6) (2005b): 835-867, p. 838; see also Jonathan W. 
Keller, ‘Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior:  A 
Contigent Monadic Peace?’ International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005a), pp. 205-231. 
45 Keller 2005b op. cit., pp. 836-7 (italics in original). 
46 See, for example, Hermann 1987 op. cit., Margaret G. Hermann, ‘Leaders and 
Foreign Policy Decision-making,’ in D. Caldwell and T. J. McKeown (Eds.) 
Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership (Boulder:  Westview Press, 1993); Margaret G. 
Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ‘Rethinking Democracy and International 
Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology’, International Studies Quarterly 39(4) 
(1995), pp. 511-34; Shannon and Keller op. cit.; Keller 2005a op. cit.; Keller 2005 op. 
cit.; Dyson 2007; Çuhadar et al 2015b. 
47 Shannon and Keller op. cit.; Hermann and Kegley op. cit.  For a connection to 
literature on management science, see Keller 2005b op. cit. 
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environments.  LTA research indicates, however, that this binary view of constraint 
challenger or constraint respecter is misleading.  Rather, as Keller argues,  “constraint 
challengers and respecters…represent ideal types.  Some leaders resemble these vivid 
portraits, but most leaders fall in between these two poles.  Nevertheless, leaders 
generally exhibit a tendency toward one or the other profile.”48   
Hermann first proposed the notion that leaders’ sensitivity to the environment 
can be derived from combinations of LTA traits.49  She argued that leaders who have 
a high need for power and a high belief in their ability to control events will challenge 
constraints (see Table 2).  Some studies support this proposition..  Schafer and 
Crichlow found, for example, that “…leaders having a high Control orientation are 
unlikely to have effective decision-making processes without the mediating effect of 
high Need for Power.”50 Dyson’s comparison of Wilson and Blair also supports this 
general pattern of different personalities’ orientations to constraints stemming from a 
combination of the power and control traits.51 
Others, however, have proposed alternative combinations of LTA traits to 
capture leaders’ orientations to constraints.  Keller, for example, combined need for 
power with leaders’ task emphasis, distrust, and nationalism traits. In addition to a 
statistical study relating the traits of 39 leaders to foreign policy outcomes, Keller 
traced the decision making process of constraint challengers and respecters and found 
considerable plausibility for his hypotheses.   Although Keller justified his use of four 
specific traits to distinguish constraint challengers from respecters, he acknowledges 
that other traits, such as the belief in the ability to control events and complexity may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Keller 2005b op. cit., p. 840.  See also Keller 2005a op. cit. 
49 Hermann 2003 op. cit. 
50 Schafer and Crichlow 2010 op. cit., p. 200 (italics in original). 
51 Stephen Benedict Dyson, ‘Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology:  
Why Did Britain Stay Out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?’ Political Psychology 28(6) 
(2007), pp. 647-666. 
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also be valid indicators, concluding that “additional research must examine the 
relative importance of each of these characteristics in shaping leaders’ responses to 
constraints.”52  Shannon and Keller argue that distrust is particularly important for 
leaders’ orientations toward international norms.  In their study of six U.S. 
policymakers’ positions on the Iraq war (and the violation of international community 
norms against the use of force in this case), they argue that “leaders who are sensitive 
to the political context and view the world as a benign international society structured 
by effective rules and institutions are less likely to violate norms than leaders who are 
relatively insensitive to the political context and view world politics as a threatening, 
anarchic domain….”53 
Table 2 
Leader’s Reaction to Constraints 
 
Need for power Belief in One’s Own Ability to Control Events 
Low High 
Low Respect constraints; work 
within such parameters 
toward goals; compromise 
and consensus building 
important.  
Challenge constraints but less 
successful in doing so because too 
direct and open in use of power; 
less able to read how to manipulate 
people and setting behind the 
scenes to have desired influence. 
High Challenge constraints but 
more comfortable doing so 
in an indirect fashion—
behind the scenes; good at 
being "power behind the 
throne" where they can pull 
strings but are less 
accountable for result.  
Challenge constraints; are skillful 
in both direct and indirect 
influence; know what they want 
and take charge to see it happens.  
Source:  Çuhadar et al (2017b), drawing on Hermann, 2003. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Keller 2005b op. cit., p. 863. 
53 Shannon and Keller op. cit., p. 97. 
	   19	  
Hermann argues that individual traits combine in certain ways to produce a 
leader’s overall orientation, or leadership style, in foreign policy.  “By knowing a 
head of government’s orientation to foreign affairs, one knows his predispositions 
when faced with a foreign policymaking task – how he will define the situation and 
the style of behaviour he will be likely to emphasize.”54  In her 1980 study, Hermann 
combined traits to produce two types of orientations:  independent and participatory.  
She found that these combinations correlated with state’s commitment, direction and 
intensity of affect, and the nature of reciprocity in its foreign policy behaviors.  
Hermann later suggested specific combinations of four LTA traits (belief in ability to 
control events, need for power, complexity and self-confidence) produce eight types 
of leader orientations.  Kille and Scully’s study on leaders of international 
organizations is one example of the use of Hermann’s combination of traits into 
composite orientations.55 
Keller and Foster combine two LTA traits -- the belief in the ability to control 
events and self-confidence – in a leader’s locus of control measure.  They argue that 
leaders high in both traits will have a strong internal locus of control (LOC) and 
“…when faced with difficult politic and economic conditions, will be much more 
confident n their ability to take the reins and manipulate the environment to protect 
their political position.  While this confident action may involve bold domestic policy 
actions…, such leaders’ internal LOC…means they will not regard military diversion 
as inherently unworkable and…they may in fact view forceful diversionary moves as 
preferable to the alternatives.”56  Leaders with an external LOC, on the other hand, 
are expected to respect constraints and “will have little confidence in their ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Hermann 1980 op. cit., p. 12. 
55 Kille and Scully op. cit. 
56 Keller and Foster, op. cit., pp. 587-8. 
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reverse these conditions.”57  Keller and Foster’s study of U.S. presidents experiencing 
poor presidential approval ratings and economic downturns generally support these 
expectations. 
 
LTA At-A-Distance Methodology 
Since social scientists do not typically have direct access to leaders, 
personalities must be captured ‘at-a-distance’.58   LTA research infers its seven 
personality traits from leaders’ verbal behavior.  Through the development of a 
standard coding scheme and computer programs for processing leaders’ text, this 
method has become very reliable, has demonstrated strong validity. 
For LTA coding, it is assumed that when leaders frequently use certain 
phrases and words, this reflects their reflects underlying personality traits (Hermann 
2003). Frequency counts take a word or phrase as the unit of analysis and produce a 
quantitative score. LTA profiles are now generated by automated machine-coding 
using ProfilerPlus, a language parsing software program developed by Social Science 
Automation.59  The program determines the percentage of particular words and 
phrases used by the leaders based on the length of the text.60  The percentages for any 
leader can be compared to those of more than 250 world political leaders and subsets 
of leaders from particular countries and regions. Through such comparisons to these 
norming groups, it becomes possible to determine whether a trait is high, low, or 
average for the particular leader (Hermann 2003).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Keller and Foster, op. cit., 587. 
58 For an excellent recent review of at-a-distance analysis, see Mark Schafer, ‘At-A-
Distance Analysis,’ in Rhodes and Hart op. cit. 
59 SSA is headed by Michael R. Young; Margaret Hermann was co-founder in 1997. 
In ProfilerPlus, SSA converted Hermann’s Leadership Traits Analysis and Steven 
Walker’s Operational Code Analysis hand-coding practices to automated coding (see 
www.socialscience.net). 
60 See Hermann (2003 op. cit.) on how scores are calculated on each personality trait. 
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Although machine coding has made LTA personality profiling very and other 
reliable, the issue of validity continues to surface in LTA research: do the words of 
leaders really reflect the underlying characteristics of their personality characteristics?  
Do leaders even write their own speeches or interview responses?  Do they not tailor 
their verbal behaviour to specific audiences and across time?  Do they not deceive or 
merely speak what their institutional role demands?  Is LTA able to capture 
personality characteristics with its standard coding across variation in language? 
Many researchers have addressed these questions by using only interviews and other 
spontaneous material than than prepared speeches. Scholars also argue that leaders do 
have some control over their speech acts and that LTA captures leaders’ public 
personalities (rather than their private ones) and that public personalities are more 
important for explaining policymaking processes and foreign policy choices.61   
Some have also assessed the validity of LTA profiles by using them in tandem 
with case studies to see if the personality traits play out in decision-making processes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For discussions and examinations of these issues, see Brian Dille and Michael D. 
Young, ‘The Conceptual Complexity of Presidents Carter and Clinton:  An 
Automated Content Analysis of Temporal Stability and Source Bias,’ Political 
Psychology 21 (2000), pp. 587-595; Gregory B. Marfleet, ‘The Operational Code of 
John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Comparison of Public and 
Private Rhetoric,’ Political Psychology 21 (2000), pp. 545-558; Mark Schafer, ‘Issues 
In Assessing Psychological Characteristics At a Distance,’ Political Psychology 21 
(2000), pp. 511-527; Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, ‘Bill Clinton’s Operational 
Code:  Assessing Source Material Bias,’ Political Psychology 21 (2000), pp. 559-571. 
Schafer and Walker, op. cit.; Jonathan Renshon, ‘Stability and Change in Belief 
Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush from Governor to Second-term 
President,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (2008), pp. 820-849; Jonathan Renshon, 
Jonathan (2009) ‘When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs:  Assessing 
Operational Codes at a Distance,’ Political Psychology 30 (2009), pp. 649-661; 
Shannon and Keller op. cit.; Schafer and Crichlow 2010 op. cit.; David G. Winter,  
‘Leader Appeal, Leader Performance, and the Motive Profiles of Leaders and 
Followers: A Study of American Presidents and Elections’, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 52 (1987), pp. 196–202; David G. Winter, ‘Personality 
Profiles of Political Elites,’ in Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (Eds.) 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2013); Schafer 2015 op. cit. 
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in ways we would theoretically expect them to62 – if they do, we can have greater 
confidence in LTA’s validty.  Finally, at-a-distance analysts argue that some of these 
validity questions are indeed empirical questions and can, and have, been examined.   
As a result of all these efforts, Schafer argues, we now have “plenty of evidence that 
supports the effectiveness of using prepared speech acts as psychological 
indicators.”63 
 
Current Challenges and Future Research Avenues For the Study of Leaders in 
International Relations 
While the research programme on leaders’ personalities (including Leadership 
Trait Analysis but also Operational Code Analysis, Motive Analysis, and leader 
biographies) offers significant insights, there are numerous important directions in 
which future work in this area should concentrate to further our understanding of how 
leaders influence world politics. 
 
Unpacking Constraints 
As discussed above, LTA research has shown that one of the most significant 
and consequential differences distinguishing one leader from another, is the degree to 
which the leader challenges or respects constraints, including structural constraints. 
Despite the consistent finding, the concept of ‘constraints’ is under-developed.  
Constraint is a catchall term that has included a range of international and domestic 
obstacles in leaders’ environments.  We know little about how different leaders 
respond to similar constraints and how leaders respond to different types of 
constraints, despite the recognition in psychological research that different situations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 E.g., Dyson 2009 op. cit.; Çuhadar et al. 2017b, op. cit. 
63 Schafer and Crichlow 2010 op. cit. 
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strengthen or weaken the importance of different personality traits.64  This is partly 
because some LTA research only examines single leaders.  Other work that compares 
leaders, such as Dyson’s comparisons of UK Prime Ministers Wilson and Blair and 
Rumsfeld and G.W. Bush, Shannon and Keller’s study of six U.S. policymakers, and 
Çuhadar et al’s work on Turkish leaders, serves as a foundation on which to build, but 
this work is limited in its focus on a few leaders facing the same constraints or in its 
lack of tracing the underlying process of how different personality traits respond to 
constraints.65    
Moreover, there has been no systematic effort to distinguish the types of 
constraints leaders face and the interaction of their personalities with the constraints in 
their environments – the interaction of agents with structures. Indeed Dyson argues 
that “classifying a leader as a constraint challenger or constraint respecter would beg 
the question which constraints are to be challenged or respected?.....” 66  Dyson 
problematizes the type of constraints leaders respond to, in his comparison of Wilson 
and Blair’s varying orientations to domestic and international constraints.67  Dyson’s 
study and Çuhadar et al’s work on personality stability across institutional role 
positions are good starts to answer the question:  Which constraints?  All international 
constraints, for example, are not the same – they may be material or normative, and 
come from different types of sources, such as enemies or allies. Do some leaders 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, ‘A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of 
Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in 
Personality Structure,’ Psychological Review 102 (1995),  pp. 246-68; Richard K. 
Hermann, Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser, ‘Mass Public Decisions to Go to 
War:  A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework,’ American Political Science Review 93 
(1999), pp. 553-573. 
65 Schafer and Crichlow 2010 op. cit.; Dyson 2007 op. cit.; Dyson 2009 op. cit.; 
Shannon and Keller op. cit.  Keller and Foster (op. cit. and Foster and Keller, op. cit.) 
also examine several post-World War II use presidents but do not really compare 
them (just their comparative effects in statistical analyses). 
66Dyson 2007 op. cit., p. 656 (italics in original). 
67 Dyson 2007 op. cit., p. 657. 
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privilege one international constraint over the other, while others respect all 
constraints and still others challenge all types of external constraints?   
Leaders are, of course, also constrained by their internal political situations, 
institutions, and prevailing ideational contexts.  This has been the subject of some 
LTA research. Foster and Keller’s study, for example, focuses on internal constraints 
(in the form of domestic economic problems) and U.S. presidents’ use of diversionary 
force as partly a function of their leadership traits, but they do not trace the process 
and underlying mechanisms of their statistical results.  They note that “the empirical 
study of how leadership style moderates the relationship between domestic tenure 
threats and the political use of force should be extended beyond American Presidents 
to other world leaders….”68 Keller does trace the process by which Kennedy, a 
‘constraint respecter’ and Reagan, a ‘constraint challenger’ responded to domestic 
constraints.69  As with international constraints, there are many different types of 
domestic constraints and leaders may respond to different structures in varied ways, 
depending on their personalities.  Keller acknowledges this: “although constraint are 
often treated as a constant within a specific type of system (e.g., democracies), they 
may vary greatly over time and across issues” and calls for this focus in future 
research.70  Future research should compare a number of leaders who faced different 
types of domestic constraint and opposition and examine how different leaders 
respond to different types of domestic pressures, including ideational pressures and 
normative expectations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Foster and Keller, op. cit., p. 16; see also Keller and Foster, op. cit. 
69 Keller 2005b op. cit. 
70 Keller 2005b op. cit., p. 861. 
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Similar to Putnam’s notion of ‘chief-negotiator’ sitting at the intersection of 
international negotiations and domestic opposition,71 we can conceive of political 
leaders as frequently dealing with both internal and external constraints.  While 
previous research on political personalities has included both types of pressures,72 the 
distinction is rarely problematized.  It is often assumed that if leaders are “constraint-
challengers” in one domain, they will behave similarly in another, but this expectation 
may not hold.73  
 
Leadership Across Time 
Most research on the effects of leaders’ characteristics on foreign policy is 
static, taking a snapshot of a leader’s personality and explaining a single choice point 
or limited time of policy development.  Leaders, however, can and do change across 
time.  Modern personality theory does not expect individuals to remain static..74 
Wood and Roberts and Roberts and Mroczek argue that personality traits may change 
even into adulthood and in old age, following a role learning process.75 Hermann 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:  the Logic of Two-Level 
Games,’  International Organization 42 (1988), pp. 427-460. 
72 E.g., Dyson 2007 op. cit. 
73 Hermann 1980 op cit.; Keller 2005b op. cit.  Dyson’s (2009 op. cit.) personality 
study of Donald Rumsfeld does point out the contrast in the Secretary of Defense’s 
external worldview (with a belief that macro political forces were largely beyond 
control) with Rumsfeld’s internal style (as a highly controlling bureaucratic fighter).  
Dyson, however, only uses LTA to indicate the external aspect and does not relate 
Rumsfeld’s personality characteristics to his internal leadership style. 
74 See David C. Funder, ‘Personality,’ Annual Review of Psychology 52 (2001), pp. 
197-221; Post op. cit.; Caspi, Avshalom, Brent W. Roberts, and Rebecca L. Shiner, 
‘Personality Development:  Stability and Change,’ Annual Review of Psychology 56 
(2005), pp. 453-84. 
75 Dustin Wood and Brent Roberts, ‘Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Tests of the 
Personality and Role Identity Structural Model (PRISM),’ Journal of Personality 74 
(3) (2006), pp. 779-810; Brent Roberts and Daniel Mroczek, ‘Personality Trait 
Change in Adulthood,’ Current Directions in Psychological Science 17 (1) (2008), 
pp. 31-35.  
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argues that the permanence of a trait across situations and time is itself a personality 
characteristic and varies across leaders.76 
Although there is some good research on political leaders’ belief change (or 
stability) across time77, there is very little research on how other aspects of leaders’ 
personalities develop and how they interact with changing constraints.  Exceptions 
include Dille and Young’s work on the temporal stability of cognitive complexity in 
their study of Carter and Clinton.  Finding that Carter’s complexity trait remained 
stable (and high) across his term, while Clinton’s scores for complexity change 
(becoming simpler), the authors conclude that their results “indicate that conceptual 
complexity is stable for some people, but not for others.”78 Çuhadar et al.’s study on 
Turkish leaders does examine changes in leaders traits but their focus is more on how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Hermann 1980 op. cit. 
77 Renshon 2008, op. cit.; Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, ‘The Political 
University of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors:  Diagnostic and Strategic 
Propensities in Their Operational Codes,’ Political Psychology 21(3) (2000), pp. 529-
543; Huiyun Feng, Huiyun, ‘The Operational Codes Of Mao Zedong: Offensive or 
Defensive Realists?’, Security Studies 14(4) (2005), pp. 637-662; Samuel B. Robison, 
‘Experiential Learning by U.S. Presidents:  Domestic and International Influences in 
the Post-Cold War World,’ in S.G. Walker, A. Malici, and M. Schafer (Eds) 
Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2011); Crichlow op. cit.; 
Akan Malici and Johnna Malici, ‘The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim-Il 
Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?’, Political Psychology 26(3) (2005), pp. 387-412; 
Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, ‘Presidential Operational 
Codes and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World,’ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 44 (1999), pp. 610-625; Femke Van Esch, ‘A Matter of Personality?  
Stability and Change in EU Leaders’ Beliefs During the Euro Crisis,’ in D. Alexander 
and J.M. Lewis (Eds.), Making Public Policy Decisions:  Expertise, Skills, and 
Experience (Routledge, 2014). 
78 Dille and Young op. cit., p. 594; see also Peter Suedfeld and M. Wallace, ‘President 
Clinton as a Cognitive Manager,’ in S. A. Renshon (Ed.) The Clinton Presidency:  
Campaigning, Governing, and the Psychology of Leadership (Boulder, CO:  
Westview Press, 1995), pp. 215-233. 
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leaders adapt to new roles rather than developing the temporal aspect of personality 
development and leader learning.79 
How leaders change over time is a particularly important direction for future 
research, given the long tenure of many political leaders.  Research on leader age is 
one step forward80, but more research on the dynamics of personality evolution is 
needed.  Psychological research on individual development should inform this type of 
future research.81 
 
Connecting Across Approaches  
Most work on leader personalities in politics adopts one framework (and 
sometimes even a single trait or belief).  There are very few efforts to compare or 
combine different approaches.82 Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code 
Analysis are the two main frameworks in contemporary research on leader personality 
and foreign policy but these research programmes have developed along parallel, 
unconnected tracks.  Leader characteristics in these two approaches are likely to be 
related (both, for example, tap into leaders’ beliefs in the predictability and control of 
political events), but one analysis found that they are quite independent of each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79Esra Çuhadar, Juliet Kaarbo, Baris Kesgin, and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, ‘Personality 
or Role? Comparisons of Turkish leaders across Different Institutional Positions,’ 
Political Psychology 38(1) (2017a): 39-54. 
80 E.g., Michael C. Horowitz, Rose McDermott, and Allan C Stam, ‘Leader Age, 
Regime Type, and Violent International Relations,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 
49(5) (2005), pp. 661–685. 
81 For a review of this area of research, see Caspi, Roberts, and Shiner, op. cit. 
82 E.g., David G. Winter, Margaret G. Hermann, Walter Weintraub, and Stephen G. 
Walker, ‘The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance:  
Procedures, Portraits, and Policy,’ Political Psychology 12 (1991), pp. 457-64; Post, 
op. cit. 
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other.83 A synthesis and comparison of these techniques can tell us how general 
beliefs (measured in Operational Code Analysis) relate to specific traits (measured in 
Leadership Trait Analysis) and provide a more powerful tool for explaining and 
predicting leaders’ behaviours and choices.   
 
Building Data with ‘New’ Individual Differences 
In addition to making connections across existing approaches, future research 
on leader personality could build new empirical data on additional individual 
differences,84 including leader motives and the ‘Big Five’ personality traits.  The use 
of machine coding at-a-distance computer programmes to capture these leaders 
characteristics would make for systematic and rigorous investigations, comparable to 
existing work on Leadership Trait Analysis and Operational Code Analysis.  
Although LTA does include motives (power and task focus), ‘motive theory’ 
based on work by McClelland is a more comprehensive motive-based approach.  
Motive theory suggests three motives -- power, achievement, and affiliation – drive 
individuals’ behaviours and affect how they influence others and their environment.  
David Winter has pioneered the study of motives in political leaders and has analysed 
the motives of, for example, Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, George W Bush, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Michael D. Young, and Victoria Shafer, ‘Correlations among Leadership Trait 
Analysis and Operational Code Indicators,’ paper presented at the 46th annual 
convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 2005. 
84 Schafer recently argued that in current at-a-distance research, “the most significant 
limitation is the dearth of data” (Schafer 2015 op. cit., p. 305).  He also noted that 
ProfilerPlus has the capacity to examine many other leader characteristics such as 
optimism and helplessness and other software programs such as Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count. 
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Barack Obama85. Winter summarizes the findings from motive analyses of political 
leaders:   
“overall, these studies suggest that leaders scoring high in power 
motivation are inclined toward strong, forceful actions; as a result they 
may be charismatic to their followers…., but aggressive and warlike to 
opponents….Affiliation-motivated leaders, in contrast are more 
peaceable and cooperative—so long as they are surrounded by like-
minded others, and do not feel threatened.  Achievement motivation, 
which is usually associated with entrepreneurial success, does not appear 
to make for success in politics….Achievement-motivated leaders tend to 
become frustrated by some many inherent features of political life….”86 
 
To date, published work on leaders’ motives have been assessed through hand-coded 
content analysis, but since motive profiles are based on word-count coding schemes, it 
is possible to standardise them with machine-based coding.  Social Science 
Automation has produced a programme for capturing motives from text, this is not 
much research that has used this.87  The use of computerized programs for leaders’ 
motives would expand the universe of leaders, allow for timely analyses of current 
leaders, and generally give a boost to the study of leaders’ motives in the same way 
that ProfilerPlus catalysed research on operational codes and LTA.   
Almost entirely missing from existing research on leader personalities are the 
‘Big Five’ personality traits:  extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See, for example David G. Winter, ‘A Motivational Analysis of the Clinton First 
Term and the 1996 Presidential Campaign,’ Leadership Quarterly 9 (1998), pp. 253–
62; David Winter,’ Things I’ve Learned about Personality from Studying Political 
Leaders at a Distance,” Journal of Personality, 73 (3) (2005), pp. 557-584.  
86 Winter 2013 op cit. 
87 See http://socialscience.net/tech/Languages.aspx 
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neuroticism, and openness to experience.88  Although some of these traits may 
connect to characteristics captured in LTA, there is very little research on them 
directly.  This is puzzling and unfortunate in two respects.  First, the Big Five have 
emerged out of a long history of research in psychology that demonstrates how 
fundamental and comprehensive they are at capturing individual differences and how 
generalizable they are across cultures, time, gender and ethnicity.89  According to 
Caprara and Vecchione, “at present the Big Five represent the most widely accepted 
model to address major individual differences in behavioral tendencies in manifold 
contexts.”90  Second, the Big Five have been successfully integrated into the study of 
politics, but at the mass level, except in rare instances.  Research on self-placement on 
ideological left-right political dimensions, political party affiliation, candidate 
preference, vote choice, and public policy attitudes and preferences has demonstrated 
considerable explanatory power of the Big Five.91 Extension of ‘Big Five’ analyses to 
the study of political leaders seems to be a natural next step for future research.  
Gallagher and Allen’s study of U.S. presidents’ use of force is the rare study that 
examined the Big Five personality traits at the leader level, finding that some 
components of extraversion are associated with the use of force.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 For an overview, see R.R. McCrae and J. Allik, The Five-Factor Model of 
Personality Across Cultures.  New York:  Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 
2002). 
89 Maryann E. Gallagher and Susan H. Allen, ‘Presidential Personality:  Not Just a 
Nuisance,’ Foreign Policy Analysis 10 (2014), pp. 1-21; McCrae and Allik op. cit. 
90 Gian Vittorio Caprara and Michele Vecchione, ‘Personality Approaches to Political 
Behavior, in Huddy, Sears, and Levy, op. cit., p.6. 
91 See, for example, John T. Jost, ‘The End of the End of Ideology,’ American 
Psychologist 61 (2006), pp. 651-670; H. Schoen and S. Schumann, ‘Personality 
Traits, Partisan Attitudes, and Voting Behavior:  Evidence from Germany,’ Political 
Psychology 28 (2007), pp. 471-498; Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian V. Caprara, Michele 
Vecchione and Chris R. Fraley, ‘Voters’ Personality Traits in Presidential Elections,’ 
Personality and Individual Differences 42(7( (2007), pp. 1199-1208; R. Riemann, C. 
Grubich, S. Hempel, S Mergl, and M. Richter, ‘Personality and Attitudes Towards 
Current Political Topics,’ Personality and Individual Differences 15 (1993), pp. 313-
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In work at the mass level, Big Five individual differences are assessed through 
surveys with questions derived from personality ‘tests’ used in psychology.  These 
types of questions could be translated into a coding scheme for content analysis of 
leaders’ speeches, in the same way Margaret Hermann designed the first codebook for 
LTA.  If a Big Five content analytic scheme could be computerised, this would give 
this potential area of research the same significant advantages of computer-generated 
data for LTA and operational code analysis.  Another option for assessing leaders Big 
Five traits is to use expert judgments.  This is the method in Gallagher and Allen’s 
study, which used data collected by Rubenzer and Faschingbauer from presidential 
biographers’ ratings of U.S. presidents.92 
 
Linking to Leadership Studies  
Finally, future research on personality and foreign policy should import from 
and contribute to the vast and growing area of research on political leadership that 
does not take a psychological, personality approach. 93   Instead, this work 
“understands leadership as an interactive process between leaders and followers; 
institutions and their rules of the game, and the broader historical context.”94  The 
non-psychological approach to leadership crosses several disciplines and has much to 
offer the psychological approach to leaders. 
Research on political leadership, for example often includes assessment of the 
quality and effectiveness of leadership – how well and how should leaders manage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer, Personality, Character & 
Leadership in the White House (Washington DC:  Brassey’s, 2004). 
93  E.g., Paul ‘t Hart, Understanding Public Leadership (Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014); Rhodes and Hart op. cit.; Robert Elgie, Studying Political 
Leadership:  Foundations and Contending Accounts (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015). 
94 Paul ‘t Hart, Paul and R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Puzzles of Political Leadership,’ in Rhodes 
and Hart, op. cit., p.3. 
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crises.95 Although there is some work on the impact of personality characteristics on 
effective policy making,96 there is great potential for more theoretical development 
and empirical study in this area.  Leadership studies have also moved beyond the 
focus on leaders at the apex of the national government executive.  Work on dispersed 
democratic leadership, for example, examines and compares other types of leaders 
such as local government, party, international organizational, business and celebrity 
leaders.97 
While work on leaders has much to learn from work on leadership, this 
connection can be mutually beneficial as well.  According to ‘t Hart, “a key challenge 
for future studies of the leadership-context nexus is…to examine much more 
rigorously than it has done to date the constructed nature of this nexus.”98 He suggests 
that this “should be at the forefront of any serious effort to remove the contextual 
analysis of leadership from the outdated shackles of contingency theory, avoid the 
false clarity of deductive typological reasoning, and provide us with more firmly 
empirically grounded insight into how political leaders notice, interpret, use and leave 
their mark upon the various contexts in which they operate.”99  ‘t Hart and colleagues 
have made a similar observation with regard to the study of prime minister leadership:   
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Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure. 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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 “there is a need for more systematic knowledge about prime-ministerial 
beliefs, motives, information processing propensities, management of 
advisers and cabinets, and decision-making proclivities.  Students of 
prime ministers’ cabinet government and core executive leadership in 
parliamentary settings have rarely employed the various personality 
assessment techniques that rely on content analysis of speeches and 
interviews—a highly productive and competitive US cottage industry in 
both academic and applied research….”100 
Linking the interdisciplinary study of leadership to work on leaders’ personalities thus 
seems an especially important opportunity for future research.  Non-psychological 
approaches to leadership can offer much more attention to the importance of 
historical, cultural, situational, and contextual factors, while psychological approaches 
highlight the importance of leaders’ interpretations of those factors. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has advanced the argument that individuals are important in 
international relations by pointing to a cross-theoretical turn in IR theory to include 
agents and decision-making factors.  This turn, however, is not particularly well-
developed -- theoretically, conceptually, or methodologically.  Extant research from 
political psychology and foreign policy provides important tools to capture and assess 
characteristics of agents and their effects on international politics.  This paper 
reviewed work on the Leadership Trait Analysis approach to leaders’ personalities, as 
one example of a programme of research that is particularly suited to address agent-
structure questions.  LTA research offers IR scholars specific leader characteristics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Strangio, ‘t Hart, and Walter op. cit., p. 5; for an exception, see; Dyson 2006 op. 
cit.; Dyson 2007 op. cit.; Dyson 2009 op. cit. 
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and expectations about how they affect foreign policy choices and policymaking 
processes, as well as tried and tested methods of assessment.  This body of work, 
however, can benefit from a number of different advances in future research.  In 
particular, this article argued that unpacking the types of structural constraints leaders 
interact with, examining leaders across time, bridging different approaches to 
personality, adding new approaches with new data, and linking the study of leaders to 
work on leadership are important avenues along which scholarship can develop. 
 
 	  
